Abstract: By partially following Head and Mayer's (2003) suggestions, in this paper we test Puga's (1999) fundamental bell-shaped relationship between trade openness and agglomeration in the industrial sector. The main result is that concentration of both employment and production may arise if a pair of countries is involved in a process of trade liberalization. (2003), en este trabajo se prueba la relación fundamental de Puga (1999) entre apertura comercial y aglomeración en el sector industrial. El resultado principal es que la concentración del empleo y la producción pueden surgir si dos países entran en un proceso de integración. 
over the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta). Most U.S. congressional representatives from districts near Mexico strongly supported it, while those from districts near Canada voted against it. Such an attitude toward nafta reflects the perception that firms would move away from the northern states to the south to reach new markets (Hanson, 1998) . 2 Indeed, this concern is supported by Hanson (1996) . Another example were the spatial implications of the European Union (E.U.) enlargement by the end of 2004 .
In this context, Puga's (1999) New Economic Geography (neG) setting explains firms' incentives to locate in a particular country for different levels of economic integration between a pair of countries. At high levels of trade costs, firms decide to locate according to market size considerations. At low levels of such costs, nominal wage differentials drive firms' location decisions. In the case of intermediate levels, firms focus their attention on both backward and forward linkages. 3 The main implication of these outcomes is a non monotonic relationship between trade openness and industrial concentration. In particular, a bell-shaped curve arises: dispersion of both industrial and agricultural activities are predicted when trade costs are either low or high; and industrial concentration in one country and agricultural concentration in the other at intermediate trade costs levels.
Puga's model consists of two countries, home and foreign; in each there are two sectors, industrial and agricultural. The former employs labor and all products as inputs; and the latter employs only labor. The market structure associated with each sector is monopolistic competition and perfect competition, respectively. Labor migration is allowed across sectors but not across countries. Assuming that industrial firms in the foreign country face zero profits, and wages are equal across sectors in both countries, then all industrial firms in the home country face the same profits that might be different from zero. 4 If they are positive, new firms have incentives to enter. As a result of this shift, new conditions arise through four channels. On the one hand, a new firm means a new product Downstream firms constitute the market for upstream firms, therefore, in order to increase their sales and profits, the latter locate where the former are relatively abundant. This is the backward link. On the other hand, the concentration of upstream firms lowers downstream firm's costs through different channels: by saving trade costs, by facing lower prices due to fiercer competition in the input market; and a large variety of differentiated goods. This is the forward link.
of links between downstream and upstream firms. Some firms produce exclusively intermediate goods and others final goods. For intermediate trade costs divergence of industry and income is a feasible outcome, whereas for both low and high trade costs even industrial distribution is the equilibrium outcome, and income converges.
Puga nests Krugman, and Krugman and Venables settings by assuming that the agricultural technology might have both a common factor (labor) with the manufacturing sector and a specific immobile factor (land), respectively. Besides, in the latter case, such a technology might be not linear with respect to labor such that the discontinuity is eliminated and the bell-shaped curve of trade openness arises. Fujita et al (1999) is a particular case of Puga with a concave agricultural technology and an expenditure share of manufacturing, µ>0.5. Puga and Venables (1997) cope with the locational effects of geographically discriminatory trade policies by considering three cases: global integration, free trade areas and hub-and-spoke arrangements. Under global integration, an asymmetric equilibrium arises where its precise characterization varies with the number of nations involved, and the share of industry in consumer expenditure. In the second case, the countries within the area converge in welfare but not in industrial share. The country outside the area is negatively affected in terms of welfare and industrial share. In the last case, the number of firms and welfare increases in all countries, however, the change is larger for the hub than for the spokes. As integration proceeds, welfare converges but not thoroughly. Picard and Zeng (2005) assume that agricultural goods are costly to trade and heterogeneous across regions; there is labor and mobility heterogeneity; preferences are represented by a quadratic utility. The former assumption plays a crucial role in determining industrial structure. Given sufficiently low levels of agricultural trade costs, industrial concentration might arise for intermediate trade costs in the manufacturing sector. For high levels of such costs, dispersion is the only feasible equilibrium irrespective of the level of manufacturing trade costs.
On the empirical side, Forslid et al (2002) apply a full scale Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to investigate whether the outcomes and rationale of stylized neG models remain valid in a more complex world. By simulation they show the production pattern in different sectors as trade costs are reduced between four European regions. The most striking result is related to the textile, leather and food sectors, which show a monotonic increase in agglomeration. For example, the textile industry moves out of Central into West and South because it has relatively strong within-industry linkages. South has a comparative advantage in the production of labor intensive goods as textiles. They also simulate the location effects on industry at the aggregated level in Europe. Textiles, leather products and food products concentrate in Europe with respect to the rest of the world as trade barriers fall; while metals, machinery and chemicals decreases. In the former case, a combination of comparative advantage factors and vertical linkages explain such movements. The latter is explained basically by increasing returns to scale.
At the regional level, Combes and Lafourcade (2004) evaluate the relevance of concentration and dispersion forces contemplated in neG models for France. They find that for the center (Paris) and its periphery (Marseille), firms' mark-ups are higher than the middle point (Lyon). In the former case, low trade costs offsets competition; in the latter case, lower competition outweighs high trade costs. Furthermore, the economy displays a mono-centric pattern where Paris has larger profits that go down as firms move out. Wen (2004) assesses the spatial pattern of the Chinese manufacturing sector from 1980 to 1995. From 1953 to 1978, industrial location was not determined by economic concerns but by military considerations. He finds that as a result of economic reforms, Chinese industry become more geographically concentrated in coastal areas triggering regional income disparity. Industry location is motivated by market size considerations and foreign-related investment. Redding and Venables (2004) , by using neG ideas, find that variations in per capita income can be explained by the access to markets and sources of supply. Their main results are that market access is statistically significant to explain GDP per capita across countries. In the same sprit, Redding and Venables (2003) decompose South East Asian export's rate of growth into the contributions of improvements due to external demand and increased external supply.
It is worthwhile mentioning that spatial pattern of production and economic development can also be explained by first nature geography differences such as climate, global position, ecology, etc. (Fuchs, 1962; Kim, 1995; Gallup et al, 1998; Ellison and Glaeser, 1999; Démurger et al, 2002) .
In this paper, we test the bell-shaped relationship between industrial gap and trade costs by partially following Head and Mayer's (2003) suggestions, who confront estimates of trade openness and the range in which agglomeration takes place. 8 More precisely, by using the 8 Brakman et al (2005) apply the equilibrium wage equation to estimate two key structural model parameters for the nuts ii eu regions to estimate a trade openness parameter. nuts ii stands for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. calibration method we obtain the parameters related to technology and preferences to determine the range of trade openness in which some degree of concentration is theoretically predicted. On the other hand, from a standard neG model, an estimate of trade openness is obtained from bilateral trade and production data. Hence, we can construct a variable defined as the absolute difference between the trade openness estimate and the middle point of the agglomeration interval. The higher the level of such a variable the further the distance to intermediate costs.
A relative industrial gap measure can be regressed on such a variable after controlling for country and time. The fundamental hypothesis of this work is a negative impact of the constructed variable on the concentration variable. We use information over 14 years, 28 oecd countries and 29 industrial sectors; and three proxies of industrial agglomeration: employment gap, production gap and employment share of sector gap. By using the former two dependent variables Puga's predictions are corroborated when the constructed variable comes from a pair of countries. This paper is divided into 5 sections. Section 2 is our theoretical framework. Section 3 describes how we implement the data and sets the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 is the data description. And section 5 reports the main findings, and have some final remarks. 
Theory
We outline a particular case of Puga: Fujita et al, which assumes a strictly concave production function in the agricultural sector with respect to labor; µε(0.5, 1], the expenditure share of manufactures; and no labor mobility across regions. 9 Puga removes the exotic dynamics of Krugman, particularly, the discontinuity feature. However, in both works the curve that relates trade costs and agglomeration is neither linear nor monotonic.
This model nests three interpretations of economic development. Given high levels of international trade costs, economic integration promotes industry concentration and real wage differentials. Such a perspective is consistent with the "import-substitution" paradigm that prevailed from the 1950s through the 1960s (Krueger 1997; Edwards, 1993) . During the 1970s, a shift in the conventional wisdom arose and is consistent for 9 It is worth mentioning that both Puga and Fujita et al do not provide enough information to replicate their examples in a straightforward way. On the one hand, Puga does not specify the share of labor in agriculture. On the other hand, in Fujita et al the value of the parameter related to the specific factor in the agricultural sector is not provided. By simulation it can be obtained though. intermediate trade costs: globalization negatively impacts living standards among advanced countries whereas in developing countries the effect is beneficial (Krugman and Venables) . If integration is deepened industrial dispersion is reached and wages increase for all countries (Puga) .
In a broader time span a similar story is told by Baldwin et al (2001) . In the first stage (pre-industrial revolution), even industry dispersion is associated with high trade costs. As such costs keep falling a NorthSouth gap arises and such situation is self-sustaining. For low trade costs the gap is reduced in terms of income. 
The model
The economy consists of J countries, endowed with L j agents (consumers/workers), respectively. In each country there are two sectors, manufacturing and agriculture. The market structure of the former is monopolistic competition and the latter perfect competition. Agents can move across sectors but not across countries. λ j denotes the fraction of the labor force employed in the manufacturing sector and (1-λ j ) in the agricultural sector in country j, where L j =1.
International trade costs are of the Samuelson (1952) type: T ji ≥0 denotes the amount of any manufacturing good dispatched from country j per unit received in country i. 10 If j≠i, then T ij =T ji =T>1, otherwise, T ji =1. There are no trade costs in the agricultural sector. 11 The representative agent in country j derives her utility from the consumption of N varieties of manufactures and from the agricultural good. Her preferences are represented by
where c nj is the consumption of variety n in country j. A j is the consumption of the agricultural good in country j. As mentioned above, μ represents the expenditure share of manufactured goods. σ is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties, and also represents love for variety. For example, when (σ-1)/σ is close to 1 varieties are nearly perfect substitutes. N=n h +n f denotes the number of available varieties produced in both countries.
At the level of the firm, manufacturing exhibits increasing return to scale. The quantity of labor and inputs required to produce q units of variety n in country j is
where F and v are fixed and marginal costs, respectively. The firm that produces variety n in country j pays a nominal wage w nj for one unit of labor l nj , and pays p nj for one unit of variety n as an intermediate input.
In order to characterize the equilibrium, F=1/σ(1-α) and v=(σ-1)/σ. 12 The number of firms in each country is endogenous.
The agricultural technology in country j is represented by a CobbDouglas function. In particular, it takes the form of
where K is a fixed specific factor. γ is the share of labor in agriculture. It exhibits constant returns to scale in both factors. 13 There are two types of prices: mill (or f.o.b) and delivered (or c.i.f.). 14 The former is charged by firms. The latter, paid by consumers, is defined as
where p j n denotes the mill price of variety n produced in country j. p n ji´ is the delivered price of variety n, produced in country j and consumed in country i.
12 To assume a particular value of F means to choose units of production such that q*=1/(1-α). To assume a particular value of v allow us to characterize the equilibrium without loss of generality. 13 Puga opens the possibility of different forms of the production function. 14 f.o.b. stands for free on board and c.i.f. for carriage, insurance and freight.
The economy reaches its short-run equilibrium when both agents and firms optimize their utility and profit functions respectively such that the excess demands in the labor and product markets are zero. Nominal wages, however, may differ across the sectors.
Assumptions on agent's preferences, trade costs, technology parameters, free entry and exit of firms and a potentially unlimited value of N allow the characterization of the equilibrium as follows. Regarding the manufacturing sector, profits are zero and since there are no economies of scope, each firm produces a single variety. Every firm hires the same amount of labor irrespective of the variety they produce and its location, therefore the level of production across varieties is equal. Every firm uses all varieties as inputs; however, the optimal input combination might differ across countries. Within a country, manufacturing mill prices are equal across varieties. Regarding the agricultural sector, wages are equal to the marginal product of labor and its associated price is normalized to 1. Agents consume all varieties. Within a country consumption across agents is identical and the price index is equal for both consumers and firms. From this characterization, the short run equilibrium, given λ h and λ f , can be redefined as a vector: {n j *,w jm *,w ja *,q*,l*,A 1ja *,A 1jm , A 2ja *,A 2jm ,p j *,c 1ja *,c 2ja *,c 1jm *,c 2jm *} for j=1 and 2 such that (e.5) q*=(1-λ 1 )c j1a *+(1-λ 2 )c j2a *+λ 1 c j1m *+λ 2 c j2m *+n 1 *x j1 *+n 2 *x j2 * for j=1 and 2
and (e.6) n j *l*=λ j for j=1 and 2.
If equilibrium is feasible for a given set of parameters, then any population distribution between sectors in both countries can support the short-run equilibrium. The model does not have a closed-form solution. Thus one needs to solve it numerically. The equilibrium must satisfy a system of non-linear equations. The c jis and A jis denote the consumption of a manufacturing variety and an agricultural good respectively, produced in country j, consumed in country i by an agent in sector s. w js is the nominal wage in country j in sector s.
(e.1) and (e.2) are the optimal consumption of the representative agent in country 1 and 2, respectively. The maximization of her utility is subject to a budget constraint, where her income can be expressed either at the individual level w j , or at the aggregate level, λ j w j . The individual consumption in location i of all varieties produced in country j is denoted by n j c ji . (e.3) is the optimal level of production by any firm. The assumptions of the model allow one to obtain q* irrespective of the price and wage associated with a particular variety. (e.4) and (e.5) are the equilibrium conditions in the differentiated and homogenous product market. (e.6) is the equilibrium condition in the labor market.
For j=1 and 2, the equilibrium must satisfy the following system of 2x2 non-linear equations,
G j is the price index in country j. It represents the minimum cost of purchasing a unit of the composite index M. E j denotes the level of expenditure on manufactures in country s. 
Long-run equilibrium
When nominal wages are different across sectors, the labor force migrates from the sector with the low nominal wage to the other sector. The long-run equilibrium must satisfy the short-run equilibrium equations; w jm =A´(1-λ j ) for j=1,2 , nominal wages must be equal across sectors; and stability conditions must be satisfied. 16 The parameters to depict figure 1 are θ={σ=5, α=0.4, μ=0.55, η=0.95, γ=0.562}. These values determine the range of trade costs in which agglomeration is feasible. The lower break point is 0.152 and the upper breakpoint is 0.412. Between these points, the dispersed equilibrium is unstable. For both high and low levels, the long-run equilibria are a dispersed distribution of the industrial and agricultural sectors across countries. For intermediate trade costs, industry is concentrated in one country. In either case, international trade always takes place. In the former two cases, however, the agricultural good is not traded. In the third case, the one country is partially specialized in the agricultural sector and the other country is almost specialized in the industrial sector. Trade is always balanced. Long-run equilibrium is stable, any deviation eventually returns to the original point. Industrial agglomeration means a real wage gap between countries. Beyond a threshold, real wages are equal and jointly increase as economic integration take place. Nominal wages are equal to one at any dispersed equilibrium. 
Implementation and hypotheses
We outline the way the basic hypotheses can be stated. Particularly, implementation is divided into 4 steps, and it is applicable for any period and particular industry. 
Step 1. Measuring trade openness
Head and Mayer derive a measure of access to markets or trade openness from a standard cp framework. 17 The uncompensated consumer demand function in country i for any product from country j is denoted by 18
Since in equilibrium, prices in country i of all varieties produced in j are equal, the value of the consumer demand in i across n j products is
By defining T 1-σ ji =φ ji ∈(0,1) and after a little algebra the following equation holds
In order to obtain an access to market estimator, it is assumed that there is symmetric bilateral trade, φ ji =φ ij , and free trade within locations, φ jj =φ ii =1. Hence, the inferred trade openness measure is 
Step 2. Parameter calibration
The parameters on preferences (µ and ρ), and manufacturing and agricultural technologies (α and η), are obtained by calibration in the fashion of Forslid et al. The parameter of expenditure in manufacturing is assumed to be µ>0.5. We assume a world with j countries and 2 sectors, the agricultural one and the manufacturing good associated with the industry h. We overcome the problem of defining prices by using the mark ups calculated by Oliveira et al (1996) . Head and Mayer obtain their parameter estimates from oecd input-output tables of a particular country instead. They assume that all inputs of industry h are from the same industry and the share of labor in agriculture is assumed to be 200.
n
Step 3. Break points estimation From Fujita's et al quadratic equation, the break points that define the range of trade openness, in which a dispersed equilibrium is unstable, are obtained by solving for Z
where ∆ is determined as Step 4. Variable construction The constructed variable is
where V ij is the log of the absolute distance between the estimated measure of access to markets among countries i and j, and the midpoint of the two breakpoints given by preferences and technology of country h. So far we have not considered industry and time issues. In neG models technology and preferences are homogenous across countries. Therefore the relationship between two countries can be established as (14) log(abs(Industrial
The industrial gap between country i and j is the independent variable. We select three different sorts of this variable: i) in terms of total employment in sector s at t; ii) in terms of the fraction of the manufacturing employment in industry s at t; and iii) in terms of production in sector s at t.
In order to see if Puga's predictions about industry concentration and trade openness are valid we state three hypotheses, which do not account for the direction of concentration. Both hypotheses are connected. On the one hand, hypothesis 1 is based in terms of employment in sector s. In theory, the number of employees hired by firms exclusively depends on technology and preferences parameters. Therefore, more firms in one country are accompanied by more employees. On the other hand, more firms means higher production. Outside the rationale of the model, it is expected that production is more sensitive to changes in trade openness than employment because there is some degree of labor disposal and rigidities in the labor market.
Hypothesis 3. .For intermediate trade costs employment share concentration is expected.
This hypothesis says that concentration is conceived in terms of employment share in sector s in the whole industrial sector. We try to assess the distribution of employees across sectors. However, in the model there is room to claim that for intermediate trade costs the share is higher in one country than in other. In the model, the population in each country is normalized to one but its conclusions are spurious.
In order to test the relationship between industrial concentration and trade openness between a pair of countries, we specify the following panel data linear model (15 2002 , the information associated with industry h in country i at t is: Y stands for the gross product in US dollars; λ is the total employment in the industry; 1-λ is the total employment in the agricultural sector. From Oliveira et al(1996) , we use mark ups instead of prices (see table A.2). From the World Bank Economic Indicators, we obtain K, which denotes the area of the country.
Head and Mayer obtain the technology parameters from two sources: by the input-output matrix from stan of oecd and external sources (Hummels, 1999) . In the former case two limitations arise. First the parameters depend on a particular technology (for example the Japanese). The second one is that they assume that all inputs used by a sector only come from the same sector. c.2) Industrial gap (stan of oecd) is defined in three parts: i) employment in country i minus employment in country j; ii) production in country i minus production in country j; and iii) employment share in country i minus employment share in country j. The employment share is defined as the employment share of sector s in the industrial sector.
With the data obtained from a) we determine the breakpoints, and from the data obtained from b) we determine V ij at t for a particular sector. Each observation corresponds to a trade bilateral relationship ij at t in sector s. Table 3 reports the range of trade openness (φ lower point , φ upper point ), where trade openness is theoretically expected. 
Results and Final Remarks
Tables 1-3 report the estimates when the dependent variable is the absolute value of log of employment gap, log of production gap and the log of employment share gap, respectively. These tables are divided in 9 general industry sectors and some of them are divided in subsectors. The potential number of observations for each sector is (((28x28)/2)-28)x14 = 5,096; however, there are missing observations. Each observation corresponds to a pair of countries in one particular year. The method of estimation is unbalanced oLs panel data controlling for time and country effects.
In table 1, the dependent variable is the log employment gap, which is negatively affected by the inferred trade openness measure and are significant. R 2 ' s are relative high for all sectors. The food (1), textile (2), other non-metallic products (6) and basic metals (7) sectors are highly sensitive to trade openness, whereas wood products (3) aircraft (9.22) and office (8.21) sectors are less sensitive. Table 2 reports the results related to the production gap and are similar to the previous table.
In the case where the employment share is the dependent variable, the results vary across sectors in some cases like food (1), textiles (2) and wood (3), where the effects of falling in the agglomeration range are not consistent. Some other sectors as other non-metallic (6) are highly expected to agglomerate within the range.
It is worth mentioning that agglomeration is not only a result of only pecuniary consideration due to increasing returns to scale, positive trade costs and love for variety but also of comparative advantage.
Testing the hypotheses set out in this paper provides information on the forces behind industrial concentration. The analysis is conducted where each observation is related to a particular bilateral trade relationship. Deep down what this paper validates are three stories of development that have prevailed in the last decades. The "import substitution story" that argues that trade openness drives manufacturing concentration. The Krugman and Venables story, that claims that trade promotes convergence of both welfare and industrial agglomeration. And Puga's story that argues that minimum levels of trade openness results in mirror economies. In other words, geographical agglomeration arises as a result of consumer-proximity, supplier-proximity and factor market competition considerations. There are two types of results. According to Forslid et al, one in which the industry sector is highly sensitive to trade openness. In this case there are significant trade costs and important intra-industry linkages. The other in which trade costs are less important and trade costs have fostered specialization driven by comparative advantages. The results are consistent with Davis and Weinstein (2003) who find evidence of the home market effect for oecd countries. In sum, we find that bilateral trade at intermediate trade costs fosters agglomeration in some direction. 
